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[L. A. No. 26430.

In Bank.

199

Jan. 10, 1962.]

GEORGE H. CHULA, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR
counT OF ORANGE COUNTY, Respondent.
[1] Contempt-Acts Constituting Contempt-Misconduct of At-

[2]

[3]

(4]

(f,]

torneys.-The failure of an attorney, without valid excuse, to
be present in court at the announced time for the sentencing
of a client whom he is representing constitutes a contempt in
the immedia te view and presence of the court and hence a
Jirect contempt which the court is empowered to punish summarily under Code Civ. Pro c., § 1211.
!d.-Order-Recitals.-The requirement that an order adjudging a person guilty of contempt in the immediate view
and presence of the court must recite facts showing acts which
constitute a contempt (Code Civ. Proc., § 1211) is jurisdictional, and an order which assumes to punish summarily a
direct contempt of court is void unless it shows on its face
facts sufficicnt to constitute a legal contempt.
Id.-Order-Recitals.-In the exercise of the summary power
to adjudge a person guilty of a direct contempt, the fa cts must
bc stated in the order holding him in contempt with sufficient
particularity to show, without the aid of speculation, that a
contempt actually occurred.
Id.-Order-Recitals.-An order adjudicating an attorney in
contempt met the requirement that it show on its face facts
sufficient to constitute a legal contempt where it stated that
the attorney, pursuant to a continuance of the case, was
ordered to return and appear in court at a designated hour on
• certain date, that the attorney was present and heard and
und('rstood the order, that he had the ability to appear at
the ordered time and place, and that he wilfully neglected and
failed to so appear without sufficient reason or excuse for such
failure.
Id.-Order-Recitals.-A recital, in an order adjudicating an
att~rncy in contempt for failure to appear in court at a
deSignated time, that the attorney "had the ability to appear"

(1) AttorI\('Y's failure to attend court or tardiness as contempt,

~:; 59 A.L.R. 1272. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Contempt, § 9 et seq.;
Dr.,

Contempt, § 11 et seq.

l;) Sec Cal.J~.2d, Contempt, § 72; Am. JUT., Contempt, § 78.
celt D'

1_, . .j

References: [1] Contempt, § 15; [2,3] Contempt,
(ii
'cln)t Contempt, § 59; [5] Contempt, § 61; [6] Contempt, § 80;
(10) Co ('t mpt, ~ 81; [8] Contcmpt, § 77; [9] Judgments, § 134;
19.

n cmpt, § 57.
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was a proper conclusion of ult i lila t t ' fact conclusive on the
Supreme Court on review.
[6] ld.-Certiorari-Scope of Review.- The sole function of the
writ of certiorari in a contempt matter is to annul proceedings
taken in excess of jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court on such
review will consider the evidence only for the purpose of ascertaining whether there was any substantial evidence before
the trial court to sustain its jurisdiction.
[7] ld.-Certiorari-Grounds for Annulment of Order.-On review
of an order adjudicating an attorney in contempt, the question
whether the acts complained of can constitute a contempt is
jurisdictional, and in the absence of evidence showing that an
actual contempt of court was committed, the order of commitment should he annulled.
[8] ld. - Certiorari - Hearing and Determination.-Where the
record on certiorari showed that the trial court ordered an
attorney to appear personally at a hearing on a designated
date and there I\aS substantial evidence to support the court's
finding that the attorney had the ability to appear at the
ordered time and place but nevertheless failed to appear without sufficient reason or excuse for such failure, the trial court
could justifiably hold him guilty of contempt on the basis of
his acts as shown by the evidence.
[9] Judgments - Amendment or Correction - Clerical Errors.Where an order or judgment incorrectly records the completed judicial action of a court, the court can thereafter correct. clerical errors by making an amendment to its order truly
reflecting the court's action.
[10] Contempt-Order-Correction-Clerical Errors. - Where an
order adjudicating an attorney in contempt showed completed
judicial action, but there was a clerical error in that it ordE'red
that defendant (the person whom the attorney was representing) be taken into custody of the sheriff, while in truth and
fact the trial court had ordered that the attorney be taken
into the custody of the sheriff, it was proper for the court to
correct its clerical error or misprision.

PROCEEDING in certiorari to r eview an order of the
Superior: Court of Orange County punishillg petit ioner for
contempt of court. John Shea, Judge. Affirmed.
George H. Chula, in pro. per., A. L. Wirin, Ward Sullivan,
Russell E . Parsons, Julius L. Samson, Joan ~Iartin. Walter
Gordon, Richard Welch, Z. B. West, P. B asil Lambros and
Taylor Peterson for P etitioner.
[6J See Cal.Jur.2d, Contempt, § 80.
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Stephen K. Tamura, County Counsel, Adrian Kuyper,
Clayton H . Parker and George F. Holden, Assistant County
Counsel, for Respondent.
McCOMB, J.- Petitioner, an attorney at law, seeks a writ
of certiorari to review an order of respondent court punishing him for contempt of court.
CHRONOLOGY

1. September 15, 1960, Ossie Hanson (hereinafter referred
to as "defendant") retained the law firm of Monroe & Chula
to represent him in a criminal action charging him with three
counts of violating sections 288 and 288a of the Penal Code.
2. Septembcr 30, 1960, and October 26, 1960, a preliminary
hearing was held in the Municipal Court of the AnaheimFullerton Judicial District, and defendant was bound over to
answer in the superior court.
3. January 31, 1961, defendant appeared in the Superior
Court of Orange County with his counsel, James C. Monroe,
and moved for a dismissal of all three counts. The court dismissed counts I and II, but denied the motion as to count III.
A jury trial was waived.
4. Thereafter, following a court trial, defendant was found
guilty of one count of violating section 288 of the Penal Code.
Criminal proceedings were suspended and sexual psychopathy
proceedings instituted, at which defendant was represented
by petitioner.
5. :March 17, 1961, defendant's motion for a new trial was
denied and the matter continued for hearing relatiye to the
sexual psychopathy proceedings and pronouncement of sentence to March 31, 1961, at 9 :15 a. m., in department 5, and
petitioner and defendant were ordered to return at that time.
6. March 31, 1961, when the case of People v. Ossie Hanson
was called at 9 :50 a. m.,! petitioner did not appear in court.
However, about 20 minutes later Mr. Mueller, an associate
of petitioner, came into court and stated that petitioner had
asked hi~ to appear for him at the hearing.
7. April 7, 1961, an order to show cause in re contempt
was issued and sel"Yed upon petitioner, ordering him to appear
before respondent court at 9 :15 on April 14, 1961, to show
cause ',hy he should not be punished for contempt. There1At the subsequent contempt hearing the court stated it had delayed
calling the matter because of the absence of petitioner.
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after by stipulation thc mattcr " 'as continued until April 28,
1961, at 9 :15 a . m.
8. April 28, 1961, after a hearing, at which petitioner and
Mr. Mueller testified in petitiouer's behalf, respondent court
stated: "It is the judgment of the Court that you are in
contempt of court. It will be the sentence of this court that
you be confined to the County Jail for four days. "
9. May 1, 1961, respondent court entered, nunc pro tunc
as of April 28, 1961, the following order in the case of The
People of the State of Oalifornia, Plaintiff, vs . Ozzie Hanson,
Defendant: "JUDGMENT AND ORDER IN RE CONTEMPT. The
contempt proceedings against George H . Chula herein, having
come on regularly on an order to show cause before the
undersigned April 28, 1961, and the said George H. Chula
appearing in his own behalf, and evidence, oral and documentary having been presented and argued, and the matter
having been submitted, and good cause appearing therefor,
and it appearing that: 1. A lawful order was given to the
said George H. Chula to return and appear in the same courtroom as the one in which the order was made, to wit: Department 5; 2. The order was given pursuant to a continuance of
this case, in which the said George H. Chula was counsel for
the defendant; 3. The order was given on March 17, 1961, and
it was an order to return and appear at 9 :15 a. m ., March 31,
1961; 4. The said George H. Chula was present and heard
and understood the order; 5. The said George H. Chula had
the ability to appear at the ordered time and place; and
6. The said George H . Chula did wilfully neglect and fail to
so appear without sufficient reason or excuse for such failure .
"IT Is HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
said George H. Chula is in contempt of this Court in his
failure to obey such order, and that Defendant be taken into
custody of the Sheriff of the County of Orange, and be confin ed to the County Jail for a period of four (4) days;
"BE IT FURTHER ORDERED that execution of this order be
stayed for a period of ten (10) days from the date hereof,
to "Wit: until May 9, 1961, or, if within such period of ten
(10) days a petition for a writ to alter this order is filed in
the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court of this State, then
until the granting or'denial thereof becomes final.
"This order is to be entered nunc pro tunc April 28, 1961.
"Dated : May 1, 1961.
John Shea
Judge of the Superior Court"

CUUT, .\ V . SUPERIOR COURT
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10. May 2, 1961, the clerk entered the following minute
order relative to the April 28, 1961, proceedings: "It is the
judgment of this Court that counsel for defendant, George
Chula, is in contempt of Court. Said George H. Chula
ordered confined to the County Jail for a period of four (4)
days. "
11. May 9, 1961, respondent court entered, nunc pro tunc
as of April 28, 1961, an amended judgment and order in re
contempt. The only difference between the order entered
May 1, 1961, and the am ended order was that in the latter
the words "that the said George H . Chula be taken into
custody of the Sheriff of the County of Orange" were substituted for the words "that Defendant be taken into custody of
the Sheriff of the County of Orange," and the expiration of
the 10-day period for the stay of execution thereof appears
as May 19, 1961, instead of May 9, 1961.
Que.stions: First. Was the order of May 1, 1961, adjudicating petitioner in contempt void for the reason .that it did
not state facts showing petitioner guilty of contempt t
No . [1] The failure of an attorney, without valid excuse, to be present in court at the announced time for the
sentencing of a client whom he is representing constitutes a
contempt committed in the immediate view and presence of
the court and hence a direct contempt which the court is
empowered to punish summarily under section 1211 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. (Cf, Lyons v. Supe.rior Court, 43
Cal.2d 755, 759 [5] [278 P.2d 681].)
[2] An order adjudging a person guilty of contempt in
the immediate view and presence of the court must recite
facts showing acts which constitute a contempt. ( Code Civ.
Proc., § 1211.) This is jurisdictional, and an order which
assumes to punish summarily a direct contempt of court is
void unless it shows on its face facts sufficient to constitute
a legal contempt. (Ral:den v. SlLperior Court, 34 Cal.2d 83, 86
[2] [206 P .2d 1081] ; In re Wells, 29 Cal.2d 200, 201 [2]
[173 P.2d 811] ; Ex parte Hoar, 146 Cal. 132, 133 [79 P.
853].) [3] Such facts must be stated with sufficient particularity to show, without the aid of speculation, that a
contempt act,ually occurred. (Blake v. Municipal Court, 144
Cal.App.2d 131, 136 [7] [300 P .2d 755] [hearing denied by
the Supreme Court].)
[4] In the present case it is clear that the order of May
1, 1961, adjudicating p etitioner in contempt meets the foregoing requirement, since facts are stated therein showing
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that petitioner in the presen ce of the court committed a contempt.
There is no merit ill petitioner's con ten tion that th e order
adjudicating him guilty of cont empt d id not state facts but
merely conclusions of law. [5] A recital that petitioner
"had the ability to appear" is a proper conclusion of ultimate
fact conclusive on this court upon r eview. (Ex parte Levin,
191 Cal. 207, 208 [1] [215 P. 908] ; E x l)a rtc Spc nccr, 83 Cal.
460, 462 [23 P . 395, 17 Am.St.Rep. 266] ; In re Cal·p enter,
36 CaI.App.2d 274, 276 [1] [97 P.2d 476] ; In re W ilson, 123
Cal.App. 601, 603 [2] [11 P.2d 652]. )
In re McCausland, 130 Cal.App.2d 708 [279 P.2d 820],
relied on by petitioner, is factually distinguishable from the
present case. In such case the order was annulled because it
consisted solely of a finding that the defendant t here was
guilty of "wilfully violating" an ordcr. The court pointed
out that there was no recital in the order that the petitioner
had the ability to comply with it. In the present case there is
such a recital in the order.
In re Card ella, 47 Cal.App.2d 329 [117 P.2d 908], also
relied on by petitioner, was expressly disapproved in the later
case of In re Hadley, 57 Cal.App.2d 700, 703 [135 P.2d 381],
as being contrary to the great weight of authority.
Finally, In re Meyer, 131 Cal.App. 41 [20 P .2d 732], cited
by petitioner, is factually distinguishable from the present
case, for the r eason that in the Meyer case the petitioner then
before tbe court was discharged because he had not been
served with tbe prior order of the court, and special findin gs
showed his inability to comply with the court's order between
the date of service of the notice of the order and the date of
the contempt bearing.
Second. Were petitioner's ad s contcmptuoHs acts sufficient
to give the court juri.sdiction to p1lnish him for contempt?
Yes. [6] The sole function of the writ of certiorari in a
contempt matter is to annnl proceedings taken in excess of
jurisdiction, and this court will consider the evidence only
for the purpose of ascertaining whether there was any substantial evidence before tbe trial court to sustain its jurisdiction. (Times-Mirror Co . v. Sllpcrior C01lrt, 15 Ca1.2d 99, 115
[1] [98 P.2d 1029] ; Bridg es v. Sllp eriQ)· COllrt, 14 Ca1.2c1 464,
484 [8] et seq. [94 P .2d 983] .)
[7] Tbe question wbether the acts complained of can
constitute a contempt is jurisdictional, however, and in thc
absence of evidence sbowing that an actual contempt of court
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was committed, the order of commitment should be annulleu.
(Brunton v. 8-llperi01' Coud, 20 Cal.2d 202, 204 [1] [124 P.2d
831] ; Chula v. Superior Court, 109 Ca1.App.2d 24, 26 [1]
[240 P .2d 398] ; Wilde v. Silperior Court, 53 Ca1.App.2d 168,
178 [8] [127 P.2d 560].) Accordingly, we have examined the
r ecord for the purpose of determinillg wh ether petitioner's
acts were in fact contemptuous acts sufficicnt to give the court
jurisdiction to punish him for contempt.
The evidence shows that when the matter was called at the
March 17 hearing, neither p etitioner nor defendant was
present, and the court ordered a bench warrant issued for
uefendant 's arrest and an order issued for petitioner to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt for his
failure to appear. Petitioner and defendant appeared about
10 a. m., at which time petitioner said that his calendar showed
the hearing was set for 10 a. 1Il . anu that he and defendant had
been waiting in his office.
A discussion then took place between petitioner and the
trial judge regarding petitioner's failure to appear at the
scheduled time at a number of other hearings in the trial
court. The court vacated the order for ' the bench warrant and
the order to show cause, and after argument it denied defendant's motion for a new trial.
The probation department had not been notified of the
hearing and had not prepared its report. The application
for probation and pronouncement of judgment were therefore
continued to :March 31 at 9 :15 a . m., a time set to suit petitioner's convenience. The court admonished petitioner to be
there at that time ,yith defendant, stating : "Let's remember
it. 9 :15 a. m . I will set the matter down at 9 :15 a. m. on
Friday, the 31st day of March, in this courtroom. Each of
you are ordered and directed to report here at that time . "
The court's minute order of March 17, 1961, reads in part:
"The hearing re: Ap[llication for probation and pronouncement of judgment is continued to ~rarch 31, 1961 at 9 :15 a . m .
ill Department 5. George Chula and the defendant ordered
to return at that time. "
At the hearin:; on the order to show cause there was
evidence that a ftcr the March 17 hearing petitioner learned
it would be necessar:v- for him to be in the Indio Branch of the Superior Court of Riverside COlll1t)? on March 30 on a
matter which supposedly would take t\\""o days; that the Indio
matter was concluded on l\'1arch 30 and petitioner so advised
his office that eWl1ing; and that due to lack of transportation
petitioner had spent the night at a friend's home in Palm

-
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Springs and did not return to Santa Ana until after 10 a. m.
March 31.
The record also shows, however, that when the matter was
called at 9 :50 a. m. March 31, the court asked defendant
where his counsel was, and defendant replied, "1 stopped at
his office and he said he'd 00 here at 9:15, but he isn't here."
[ 8 ] Accordingly, since the record shows that the trial
court ordered petitioner to appear personally at the :March 31
hearing', and there was substantial evidence to support the
court's finding that petitioner had the ability to appear at the
ordered time and place but nevertheless failed to appear,
without sufficient reason or excuse for such failure, the trial
court could justifiably hold him guilty of contempt on the
basis of his acts as shown by the evidence.
Third. Did respondent court lack jurisdiction to amend the
order of May 1, 1961, in the manner in which it attempted to
do so, and was the p-nrported amended j1ldgment and order
in re contempt therefore void'
No. [9] Where an order or judgment incorrectly records
the completed judicial action of a court, the court can thereafter correct clerical errors by making an amendment to its
order truly reflecting the court's action. (Ba.stajian v. Brown,
19 Ca1.2d 209, 214 [lJ [120 P.2d 9J; Ca1'pente'r v. Pacific
i1lut. Life Ins. Co., 14 Ca1.2d 704, 707 [lJ [96 P.2d 796J ;
Waters v. Spratt, 166 Cal.App.2d 80, 85 [3J [332 P.2d 754] ;
Culligan v. Leider, 65 Cal.App.2d 51, 56 et seq. [149 P .2d
894] .)
[ 10] The order of May 1, 1961, showed completed judicial action. However, there was a clerical error, in that it
ordered" that Defendant be taken into custody of the Sheriff
of the County of Orange," while in truth and in fact the
trial court had ordered that petitioner be taken into the
custody of the Sheriff of the County of Orange. Therefore, it
was proper for the court to correct its clerical error or misprision.
The original order 2 correctly, except for the clerical error,
1'2flected the court's decision.
The trial court's order is affirmed.
Schauer, J." and White, J ., concurred.
GIBSON, C. J.- l concur.
In the usual case of direct contempt all the relevant events
·Petitioner, in his application and points and authorities, continually
refers to the clerk'8 minute order of April 28, 1961, as the judgment
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occur in the immediate view and presence of the court, whereas indirect contempt ordinarily consists of aets out of the
presence of the court. In the present case we have what
might be termed a hybrid situation; the charge of contempt
arose from events occurring in the presence of the court which
it is claimed should be excused by mattcrs taking place outside
the courtroom.
It is obvious that the disruption of judicial proceedings
caused by the absence of an attorney occurs in the immediate
view and presence of the court. The burden of excusing the
obstruction must, of course, be placed upon the attorney.
(Lyons v. Superior Court, 43 Ca1.2d 755 [278 P.2d 681].)
Where the attorney, although notified by the court to appear
at a specific time, fails to do so and does not offer an excuse,
all matters relevant to the determination of contempt happen
in court. In those cases where the attorney seeks to excuse
his conduct, the excuse ordinarily will be based on matters
occurring out of court. However, the contingency that an
attorney who is absent may later offer an excuse should not
compel a judge, when instituting proceedings, to treat the
conduct as indirect rather than direct contempt.
Much of the procedure required by statute with respect
to a charge of indirect contempt (see Code Civ. Proc.,
§§ 1211, 1212, 1217) would be pointless in a situation like the
'one before us and is unnecessary for the protection of the
rights of attorneys or for the orderly administration of justice.
When it is considered that the failure of an attorney to appear at the announced time for resumption of judicial proceedings occurs in the presence of the court and is shown by
its records, there is no reason to require the judge to file an
affidavit or statement of facts setting forth the basis of the
charge of contempt or to require him to give or obtain testimony establishing the facts. The rights of the attorney will
be fully protected by an order to show cause apprising him
of the charge against him followed by an opportunity to be
heard. If the attorney claims that his conduct is excusable,
he is entitled to a hearing where he may offer evidence.
Petitioner was apprised of the charge against him by the
ot the court finding him guilty of contempt. This is an error. Minute
order entries of the clerk are not the orders themselves. but are merely
synopses of onll·rs Illade by th e court. and do not det ermine the extent
of the judicial power of the court when a formal order hag been signed
and filed. (Rose v. Superior Court. 140 Cal.App. 418. 437 [3] et seq.
[35 P.2d 603J.)
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order to show cause, and he was given a full opportunity
to present evidence in support of his claim that hi;;; cOllduct
was excusable. Under all the circumstances, the court was
justified in concluding that petitioner did not show a satisfactory excuse for his failure to appear as directed.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
On the authority of Lyons v. Superior Court, 43 Ca1.2d
755, 759 [278 P .2d 681], the majority hold that" The failure
of an attorney, without valid excuse, to be present in court
at the announced time for the sentencing of a client whom he
is representing constitutes a contempt committed in the immediate view and presence of the court and hence a direct contempt which the court is empowered to punish summarily
under section 1211 of the Code of Civil Procedure." (Italics
added.) Thus, as in the Lyons case, the majority would condone a summary procedure that does not contemplate either
notice or hearing. The courts of other jurisdictions that have
considered this problem have held uniformly that such a
contempt may be adjudicated only after adequate notice and
hearing. (Klein v. United Stat es, 151 F.2d 286, 288 [80 App.
D.C. 106] ; Lee v. Bauer (Fla. Sup. Ct.) 72 So.2d 792, 793;
In re Clark, 208 Mo. 121, 146, 149 [106 S.W. 990, 15 hR.A.
N.S. 389] ; Weiland v. Industrial Com. of Ohio, 166 Ohio St.
62, 66 [139 N.E.2d 36] ; Ex paTte Hill, 122 Tex. 80, 82 [52
S.W.2d 367] ; State v. Wi'nfhrop, 148 Wash. 526, 531-532 [269
P. 793, 59 A.L.R. 1265].) The Lyons case has stimulated widespread criticism. (39 Minn. L. Rev. 895; 7 Hastings L .J. 312;
5 Duke L .J. 155; 9 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 93.) Its holding appears to be unique.
The classification of contempts as direct and indirect is
merely a semantic device for differentiating con tempts that
can be adjudicated summarily from those that can be adjudicated only after adequate notice and hearing. When a contempt occurs within the "immediate view and presence of
the court" the judge is fully informed of all facts necessary
to adjudicate the guilt or innocence of the alleged contemner.
,Yhen, however, the court is not so informed of such facts,
notice and hearing are necessary to get them. (B1tlcke v.
Superior Court, 14 Ca1.2d 510, 515 [94 P.2d 1006] ; In re
Cunha, 123 Cal.App. 625, 633 [11 P .2d 902, 18 P.2d 979] ;
Lapique v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App . 407, 412, 413 [229
P. 1010] ; see Dangel, Contempt, § 14.) Indeed, due process
of law requires notice and hearing in such a case. (In rll
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Oliu cr, 333 U.S. 237, 273-278 [68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L .Ed. 682] ;
Coo ke v. Ullitcd S:II !CS, 2G7 U.S. 517, 335-537 [43 S.Ct. 390,
69 L.Ed. 767] ; EII /ck c v. Su perio r COllrt, s upra, pp. 514-515;
accord: Clark v. U1Iit ed Stal cs, 61 F .2d 695, 699, affd. 289
U.S . 1 [63 S.Ct. 465, 77 L.Ed. 993] ; In I'C Collins, 329 Mich.
192, 196 [45 N.\V.2d 31] ; sec nho Carso n v. Ennis, 146 Ga.
726, 728 [92 S .E. 221, L.RA. 1917E 650] ; P eople v. Rosenthal, 370 Ill. 244, 248-249 [18 N.E .2d 450, 125 A..L.R. 127] ;
Cushman Co. v. Mackes'!}, 135 liTe. 490, 494 [200 A. 505, 118
A.L.R. 148] ; In I'e Clark, supra; State ex rcI. Beck v. Lush,
168 Neb. 367, 370 [95 N.W.2d 695] ; Ex parte Mylius, 61
W.Va. 405, 407 [56 S.E. 602, 10 L.R.A. N.S . 1098, 11 Ann.
Cas. 812].)
In stating that" The failure of an attorney, without valid
excuse, to be present .. . constitutes . . . a direct contempt"
(italics added), the majority opinion itself implicitly concedes that petitioner's contempt, if any, cannot be subject to
summary punishment. The absence of a valid excuse is an
indispensable element of the contempt. The trial judge could
not discover the nature of the excuse or determine it., validity
without a hearing.
In the Bulcke case, supra, this court held: "The power of
a court to punish [summarily] for a direct contempt is based
upon the judge's knowledge of the commission of the act by
the contemner. A judge usually cannot say with any certainty
that a letter or telegram received by him purporting to be
signed by a certain person was either written or sent by that
person; henc e such an act, if contumacious, should be classifi ed as an indirect contempt." Similarly, a judge usually
cannot say with any certainty that an attorney's absence is
"without ,alid excuse." H ence, such absence, if contumacious, should be punished only after notice and hearing.
The trial judges both in this cn .:;e and in the Lyons case
recoguized that they did not haw the information necessary
to decide the guilt or innoc-ence of the alleged contemners,
and so held hearing'S in ".hich the excuses were prescnted and
judged as to their suffic iency. In th e present case the h earing
followed formal notice in the form of an order to sho" cause.
In the Lyons case there was no such formal notice. The judge
orally ordered the attorney to show cnuse why he should not
be held in contempt and d ec ided immediately upon the
validity of the excuse.
Section 1211 and section ] 217 of the Code of Civil Procedure establish two procedures for the adjudication of eon-
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tempts. The first is summary, and may be invoked when
the judge has in his possession all facts necessary for the
adjudication of guilt or innocence. The second applies when
the judge does not have such facts, and requires that "an
affidavit . . . be presented to the court or judge of the facts
constituting the contempt, or a statement of the facts by the
referees or arbitrators, or other judicial officers." The accused
is notified of the charge against him, and the affidavit or
statement of facts, like a complaint, indictment, or information, frames the issues to be adjudicated at the hearing
required by section 1217.
Although the Legislature may not be free to limit the inherent power of constitutional courts to punish con tempts
by determining that certain acts shall not constitute contempt, it clearly may "provide for the procedure by which
such contempt shall be tried and punished . . . . " (Bridges
v. Superior C01lrt, 14 Cal.2d 464, 480 [94 P.2d 983].) Denial
of this power "would be tantamount to a denial of legislative power to regulate the practice and procedure by which
our courts are governed, a power which, "ithout constitutional authority, is universally recognized in all states where
the code system of pleading and practice prevails." (I n re
Garner, 179 Cal. 409, 412 [177 P. 162].) The Legislature
"may provide rules of procedure . . . which, if adequate for
the purpose designed, must be deemed operative in controlling
the action of the court." (Ibid., p. 413.)
Thus, any departure from the procedure set forth in the
Code of Civil Procedure must be justified by a demonstration
that they are inadequate, that they provide either too little
or too much protection to those accused of contempt. There
is no suggestion that the statutory procedures are not sufficiently strict. There is no suggestion that the hearing required by section 1217 is less than that necessary to satisfy
due process of law. Apparently any disagreement with the
statutory procedures is based upon the view that the notice
requirements of section 1211 are too strict. But this requirement, too, is minimum. The order to show cause filed by the
judge in this case, for example, is a sufficient statement by a
judicial officer to institute proceedings under section 1211.
That order provides: "Please take notice that you George
H. Chula, are hereby direeted and ordered to appear before
this Court in Department 5 thereof at 9:00 A. M., April 14,
1961, then and there to show cause why you should not be
held in contempt of this Court for willful failure to obey a
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lawful order of this Court made in this ease March 17, 1961 ,
to wit: To appear at 9 :1 5 a . m. before this Court, Friday,
March 31, 1961." By allegin g that p et itioncr's fai lure to
appear was" willful," th e order meets the r equirement that
a statement of facts und er sectio n 1211 charge kn owledge
of the order allegedly disobeyed (see Phillips v. Superior
Conrt , 22 Ca1.2d 256, 258 [137 P .2d 838]) and ability to
comply . (See Jl.fcry v. Sup erior Court, 9 Cal.2d 379, 380 [70
P .2d 932].) P etitioner's failure was not willful if he did
not know of the order or if he was unable to appear through
no fault of his own. The allegedly contemptuous act-tM
failure to appear as ordered-is specified in the order. The
order to show cause thus meets the requirements for initiation
of indirect contempt proceedings under section 1211 by framing the issues to be adjudicated at the subsequent hearing.
(See Comm ercial Bank v. Sup c1'ior COllrt, 192 Cal. 395, 396
[220 P. 422] ; B erger v. Superio r Court, 175 Cal. 719, 720721 [167 P. 143, 15 A.L.R. 373] ; Strain v. Superior Court,
168 Cal. 216, 220-222 [142 P . 62, Ann.Cas. 1915D 702];
Frowl ey v. Superior Cow'f, 158 Cal. 220, 222 [110 P . 817] ;
Ott's v. Sup erior Conrt, 148 Cal. 129, 130-131 [82 P. 853 ] ;
Hutton v. Sup erior COllrt, 147 Cal. 156, 159 [81 P. 409];
Rogers v. Sup erior Court , 145 Cal. 88, 91 [78 P. 344] .) The
hearing held completed the procedure in accordance with section 1217 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The procedure followed in the Lyons case did not comply
with section 1211, for the oral" order to show cause" employed
by the judge in that case gave the accused no time to prepare
his defense, to obtain assistance, or to marshall evidence in
support of his explanation. There is no justification for permitting trial judges to institute contempt proceedings in cases
of this kind without providing meaningful not ice and time for
preparation.
The statutory procedures for contempts as to which the court
is not fully informed are entirely adequate for this kind of
case, and are therefore controlling. (In re Garner, s1lpra. )
Judicial cr eation of a n ew procedure, unelaborated by statute
or by a background of decided cases, can only add confusion
that may easily be avoided by use of the well-defined statutory
procedures with which our courts have had extensive experience. Anything less than the protections afforded by these
procedures would be inadequate.
Although the proper procedures for adjudicating the contempt charged in this,case were followed, the facts established
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do 110t support the judgment. P etitioner \\·as !lot ~ol c (·O I1l1 Srl
for hi s eli ellt, for the client had retained the firm of Monroe
am1 CI11lla to r eprese nt him and Monroe represe nted the r.1if'llt
before and during the trial. "We will take ju (licial noti!'!'
of the fact that in California it is, and for a lon g t im p. has
oeen, a gell eral custom sanctiolled by recognition of the C011rts
for attorneys at law singly and by firms to employ attorneys
at law to assist in legal work plated in their care, including
appearances in court ·without the formality of being made
attorneys of record . . . . The simple action of petitioner in
line with the established custom neither satisfied the requirem ents of contempt of court nor the r equirements for conviction of that offense." (Raskin v. Sup erior Court, 138 Cal.
App. 668, 670 [33 P.2d 35] .) In the Raskin case it was held
that a substitute could not be held in contempt merely for
appearing as a substitute. Similarly, the principal attorney
who procures a competent substitute cannot be held in contempt.
Petitione r testified that he obtained a substitute, an associate
in his office, because he was to be away in connection with
another case. His testimony was supported by that of his
associate and substitute. This t estimony is not in conflict with
the client's statement that" I stopped at his office and he said
he'd be here at 9 :15, but he isn't here." The court asked only
where the client's" counsel" was, and he did not indicate to
whom he had spoken. Since other attorneys than petitioner
represented the client, there is no basis for inferring that the
client spoke to petitioner rather than to one of the others.
::\Iol'eoYer, the client did not say whether he had stopped at
petitioner's office on the morning of the hearing or at some
preyious time.
Had the substitute appeared pnnctually, there would have
been no basis for a contempt charge. Nor can petitioner be
punish ed for his substitute's tardiness unless he authorized
or should have foreseen it. Even if the facts might support
a charge of contempt against the substitute, they do not support such a charge against petitioner.
Of course unexcused absences by co ullsel cannot be condOll ed. EYen though the r ecord indicates that petitioner has
frequent ly fail.ed to appear in court when he should, he was
not charged with such misconduct and it cannot justify holding bim in contempt of an order he did not violate.
Peters, J., and Dooling, J., concurred.

